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Thoughts on the Ethno-Territorial Demands of
Kurdish Political Groups
Kurdish political parties in the Middle East are more important
political actors than ever before. Yet whether they prefer mere
autonomy or a nation state remains unclear as LSE PhD candidate
and Emirates PhD Award winner Zeynep Kaya considers.
By Zeynep Kaya
There is no doubt that Kurdish political parties in the Middle East are
more important political actors than ever before. In April, the Iraqi
Kurdistan Regional President, Massoud Barzani,  was granted  an official
reception with President Obama in the White House, which shows the
importance given to Barzani’s leadership by the US. There are also
increasing signs of an assertion of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s
autonomy from the Baghdad government when it comes to oil
exportation. In Iran, ongoing tensions between Kurdish tribes, intellectual
elites and the Iranian state look unlikely to end in the near future. The
Kurds in Syria continue to be severely suppressed and many are denied
citizenship. Unsurprisingly, many Kurds are part of the protestors against
Assad’s regime. Yet perhaps the most seemingly complicated and
pressing Kurdish challenge presently lies in Turkey.
In Turkey, the Kurdish problem is a pressing issue that requires an urgent
solution because of its domestic implications as well as its negative
influence on Turkey’s foreign relations. The PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party)
and the BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) have repeatedly voiced a
desire for a solution in the form of Kurdish autonomy within Turkey. They
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have been quite assertive in their insistence that they are ready to
negotiate a solution as long as Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of
the PKK, is released and the Turkish government agrees to sit at a
negotiation table with him. Meanwhile, the Turkish government leaders
publicly declare that they refuse to negotiate with what they consider a
terrorist organisation. There is no immediate sign of a solution.
Yet whether Kurdish leaders see autonomy as a step towards future
independent statehood or not is unclear. Alongside their seemingly
traditional demands for Kurdish self-determination, they also often claim
that ‘nation-states’ are a thing of the past. The BDP leaders deny that they
are engaged in ethno-politics, and instead claim that they are actually
aiming only for recognition of the Kurds and the creation of a more
pluralist and democratic Turkey. They state that the amibitions of Kurds
in Turkey are decidedly different from that achieved by their Iraqi Kurd
neighbours. Such a rejection of Iraqi Kurdistan is intriguing and perhaps
can be attributed to the internal instability in northern Iraq stemming
from corruption scandals, dissident activities and illegal detentions.
Given this picture, it is a fair statement to say that Kurdish nationalist
organisations typically define their goals and problems in a way that is
strictly limited to the country in which they reside without reference to
other Kurds and Kurdish parties from other states. Each group faces
different problems that have emerged as a result of the distinct political,
social, historical and economic circumstances of each state. In fact, no
contemporary Kurdish nationalist party in the Middle East so far has
made an explicit demand to establish a greater Kurdistan (defined as the
ideal homeland of Kurds), that would unite all the Kurds living in different
states within a new single political entity.
The notion of greater Kurdistan and maps of this territory are the most
obvious aspects of Kurdish nationalism and they stand in stark contrast to
the actual divided status of the Kurds and the aims of the various parties
which lead them. In spite of this, the notion of greater Kurdistan and its
cartographical depiction are commonly used in the rhetoric of almost all
Kurdish nationalist organisations and activist groups, both in the region
and in the diaspora. Kurdish nationalists’ use of the notion of Kurdistan
(encompassing sections of the territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria and
Armenia) is based on a claim to ownership of this territory since 4,000
BCE. Such a claim forms the basis of the perception that Kurdistan is an
existing ethnic/national territory.
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However, what is most interesting is that this understanding of Kurdistan
has moved beyond the discourse of Kurdish nationalists and become
embedded in the language used by other influential groups, too. Many
state politicians have adopted similar conceptions in their attempt to
support the Kurdish cause by encouraging their states to put pressure on
regional governments, particularly evident in the cases of Turkey and
Iraq. Today, both Kurdish nationalists and their sympathisers often refer
to the region as ‘Kurdistan’. In this context, notions of ‘eastern Turkey’ or
‘northern Iraq’ seem to fail to express their aspirations.
The map of Kurdistan appears on Kurdish websites and in academic
works, journals and newspapers. It is well-established that this map
overlooks the heterogeneous character of the population inhabiting the
area as well as the political boundaries of the existing states. However,
many outsiders still readily accept the accuracy of the boundaries
indicated on this map and, generally speaking, fail to indicate the
heterogeneous population of the region. As such, even though the idea of
greater Kurdistan is generally perceived as unfeasible, it is considered by
the majority of the international community of scholars, activists,
journalists and certain state officials to represent the Kurdish people’s
ethnic and historical territory.
In my PhD research, I have been exploring the possible reasons why
territorial claims typically embrace, either implicitly or explicitly, ethnic
conceptions, looking at the Kurdish case in particular. An ethnicist
understanding of nations in the academic and non-academic literature
implies that a territory is more or less a given feature of groups, based on
objective characteristics and features. Such a view strengthens and gives
credibility to perceptions of a Kurdish homeland and underpins the map
of Kurdistan. Kurdish activists in the region and in the diaspora have
unfailingly promoted the idea of Kurdistan to the international
community, often framing their promotions within the language of
human rights and self-determination to make their claims as legitimate as
possible to those democratic countries whose influence they are trying to
gain.
Understanding why sub-state nationalist groups, such as the Kurds, adopt
specific ethnic and territorial identities requires an awareness of the
political and international ideational context in which sub-state groups
interact with other international actors. Therefore, the meaning sub-state
nationalist groups attribute to self-determination is often and certainly in
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the Kurdish case, linked to a specific normative context that embraces a
belief in democracy and human rights for groups with distinct cultural,
linguistic and ethnic characteristics. National self-determination relies on
liberal principles such as self-rule and democracy, but at the same time it
reifies the primordial and ethnic features of a national identity. Framing
their claims to autonomy or independence based on distinct cultural and
ethnic characteristics within the context of self-determination help them
to maximise their legitimacy and influence within international society.  
With this is mind, the question then becomes whether a form of politics
based on ethnic conceptions of national identity is the best route for a
democratic and peaceful solution to the Kurdish issue.
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